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is compatible in the ISM wireless bands and channel schemes.
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usage is free of licensing in the European Union.
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utilises BlueTooth® 2.45 GHz wireless systems for small and simple tokens.
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requires no exclusive usage of frequencies or channels.
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complies with standardisation of IEEE and ISO.
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prefers standardised components and is compatible with usual BlueTooth® units.
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uses instead of simple dongles the TokLoc® BlueTooth® Screentenna.
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requires for distinction of instances just one BlueTooth® unit per object.
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needs a minimal operational setup of infrastructure on the basis of existing standards.
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starts on the basis of simple common and mandatory prerequisites: All subscribed shall wear a TokLoc® token. Objects of interest shall be labelled or tagged with Tags working as TokLoc® tokens. Then TokLoc® functions operate autonomously and dependent to the actual contiguity.
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works on the basis that BlueTooth® identity gets read on approach to an equipped work position.
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primarily serves for access control on approach and at access.
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defines the work position as the operational theatre and ignores remote objects and persons.
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recognises the presence of a token in contiguity through common inquiry or directed paging.
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concept goes far beyond index locating as with fixed RFID reader positions. Contiguity information is obtained from repetitive enquiry or paging.
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implementation may be matched with directly related sequences of video records at choke points. Video recording at work positions with individuals is generally not supported.
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stipulates neither real time tracking nor any retrospective tracing.
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performs much better than with choke point or handheld reading of passive RFID tags.
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makes the most of physics and logics with wireless locating.
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works on the basis that BlueTooth® token get recognised in the contiguity or on approach to equipped work positions and with reading the identities.
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recognises well the limitations of physics and the limitations of components.
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makes no assumptions on operational conditions but just takes the physical restrictions and the technology limits into account.
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in addition to scanning and detecting infers the results of the applied technologies to one comprehensive access control regime.
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